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Tax Amnesty Decisions

AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION OF EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC
MOTIVATIONS IN TAX AMNESTY DECISION-MAKING
Jonathan Farrar1, Cass Hausserman2

Abstract
The tax compliance literature on tax amnesties does not explicitly consider the underlying
motivational influences on taxpayers’ self-correction decisions. Extant tax amnesty studies imply
that extrinsic motives are the basis for self-correction, and only a few consider intrinsic motives
(Rechberger, Hartner, Kirchler & Hämmerle, 2010; Torgler & Schaltegger, 2005). Consequently,
we explore how extrinsic and intrinsic motives affect tax amnesty decision-making, following an
unintentional taxpayer error. We conduct a quasi-experimental conjoint analysis on 1,266
taxpayers and vary the error magnitude. Results indicate that when taxpayers contemplate making
a tax amnesty disclosure, desire to avoid a penalty is the most influential extrinsic motive, and
responsibility to pay one’s taxes is the most influential intrinsic motive. Extrinsic (intrinsic)
influences account for about two-thirds (one-third) of the overall decision to make a tax amnesty
disclosure. We also find that taxpayers’ choices of extrinsic and intrinsic motives do not vary
according to tax error magnitude. Implications for tax authorities and tax researchers are discussed.

INTRODUCTION
There is growing acceptance among tax researchers that taxpayer decision-making is complex and
nuanced, and based on both extrinsic and intrinsic factors (Alm, Kirchler & Muehlbacher, 2012;
Alm & Torgler, 2011; Feld & Frey, 2002). An individual who is motivated extrinsically expects
to receive a benefit or avoid a punishment from an external source, whereas an individual who is
motivated intrinsically is prompted to act for reasons of personal morality or internal feelings of
satisfaction (Ryan & Deci, 2000). In the tax context, it follows that taxpayers may be motivated
extrinsically or intrinsically to comply with a tax authority. From a tax authority perspective,
appealing to taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations rather than extrinsic motivations may be a lower-cost
alternative, since it would not require the same human resources to detect and subsequently
respond to a discovery of non-compliance. Given that tax authorities worldwide are increasingly
facing budgetary restrictions, with 60% of tax authorities reporting reductions in staffing in recent
years (OECD 2015a), developing a better understanding of taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations
relative to extrinsic motivations may be a useful objective.
Although tax researchers suggest that taxpayers have intrinsic motivations to comply with tax
authorities (Alm, Kirchler & Muehlbacher, 2012; Alm & Torgler, 2011; Braithwaite, 2009; Dunn,
Farrar & Hausserman, 2016; Frey, 1997), much remains to be understood about taxpayers’
1
2

Associate Professor, Ted Rogers School of Management, Ryerson University
Assistant Professor of Accounting, Portland State University

47

Journal of Tax Administration Vol 2:2 2016

Tax Amnesty Decisions

intrinsic motivations. As McKerchar, Bloomquist & Pope (2013, p.6) state, “Many have attempted
to shed light on taxpayers’ internal motivations… but hard evidence is difficult to find.” Dwenger,
Kleven, Rasul & Rincke (2016) acknowledge that relative to extrinsic motivations, intrinsic
motivations are the hardest to measure and study empirically, and therefore the least well
understood.
The purpose of this research is to develop a better understanding of extrinsic and intrinsic
motivations in taxpayer decision-making. We develop this understanding by examining taxpayers’
attitudes towards making a tax amnesty disclosure, following an unintentional tax reporting error.3
Tax amnesties and voluntary disclosure programs are relatively low-cost compliance initiatives in
which taxpayers are given the opportunity to self-correct errors on previously filed tax returns. A
tax amnesty tends to be a one-time opportunity for self-correction with an expiry date, whereas
voluntary disclosure programs are permanent and ongoing.4 By self-correcting, taxpayers pay the
taxes that would have resulted had the amounts been correctly reported, usually with interest, but
can avoid the penalties and/or sanctions that would have been imposed had the tax authority
discovered the errors. Forty-seven countries now offer permanent amnesty programs (OECD
2015b), which suggests that tax authorities view the tax amnesty as an increasingly important tax
compliance initiative.
Empirical studies suggest that amnesties have direct and indirect effects on tax revenues.
Nevertheless, many studies suggest that tax amnesties are not particularly effective at encouraging
participation in tax amnesties, resulting in net revenue gains from amnesty programs that are only
modest at best. For example, Hasseldine (1998) analyzed a number of state tax amnesties in the
United States, and found that amnesty revenues range from just 0.008 to 2 percent of state tax
revenues. Moreover, these studies tend to assume that taxpayers consider only the economic costs
and benefits of self-correction decisions (i.e. extrinsic factors), and therefore overlook noneconomic factors (i.e. intrinsic factors) that may contribute to participation in tax amnesties.
Perhaps tax amnesties would be more effective at generating revenue and increasing subsequent
compliance if intrinsic motives were better understood and incorporated into the design of tax
amnesties.
In this exploratory study, we address two primary research questions, as follows: 1) Which
extrinsic and intrinsic motives have the greatest influence on taxpayers’ decisions to correct a tax
error?; and 2) How does tax error magnitude impact these decisions? Since empirical research
suggests that individuals justify dishonesty in small amounts, but less so in large amounts (Ariely
2008; Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008), we believe it is important to understand taxpayers’
motivations across different error thresholds. We use a quasi-experimental conjoint approach to
investigate the relative importance of various extrinsic motives within a set of extrinsic motives,
and the relative importance of various intrinsic motives within a set of intrinsic motives. Conjoint
analysis is a statistical technique which determines how individuals choose among alternatives.
3

We focus on unintentional errors because the research is exploratory and we wanted to appeal to a broad base of
taxpayers. Although tax authorities hope to encourage taxpayers who made unintentional and intentional errors to
participate in amnesty programs, it would be unrealistic to ask participants questions about a scenario in which they
were told to assume that they had purposefully evaded taxes.
4
In this article, we use the term ‘tax amnesty’ to refer to any program offered by a tax authority for taxpayers to selfcorrect past errors.
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Participants were given combinations of extrinsic and intrinsic motives, and asked which
combination would be most effective at convincing them to report their mistake. Our research is
quasi-experimental, as we vary the error magnitude among participants in three ways ($500,
$5,000, and $50,000). Since the conjoint analysis methodology does not allow for examination of
relative importance across factors, we also conduct a supplemental analysis to examine the relative
importance of extrinsic versus intrinsic motivations. For this supplemental analysis, a different set
of participants allocate points based on how important each of the eight factors would be in their
decision, without regard to whether they are intrinsic or extrinsic.
We find that desire to avoid a penalty was the most important extrinsic motive, and responsibility
for paying taxes owed was the most important intrinsic motive. Collectively, extrinsic (intrinsic)
motives accounted for approximately 66% (34%) of the amnesty participation decision. We also
find that taxpayers’ relative preferences for extrinsic and intrinsic motives did not vary
significantly according to error magnitudes. Thus, taxpayers’ motivations for self-corrections
appear stable, regardless of the size of their error.
This research contributes to the tax compliance literature by: identifying the most important
extrinsic and intrinsic motives in a self-correction decision; by examining taxpayers’ relative
preferences within each set of motives; and by considering the role of error magnitude in
compliance decisions. Existing research that investigates how intrinsic motives impact tax
amnesties is limited (Rechberger et al., 2010; Torgler & Schaltegger, 2005), and empirical tax
amnesty research tends to focus on subsequent income reporting or subsequent revenue collection
effects, rather than on the reasons why taxpayers might be inclined to participate in a tax amnesty.
In other words, tax amnesty research tends to be reactive rather than proactive, since it examines
the after-effects of tax amnesties. In contrast, the present research contributes to this literature by
examining taxpayer attitudes and intentions when an amnesty participation decision is
contemplated. Our results should also be of interest to tax authorities looking to design or improve
revenue collection through tax amnesties.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we conduct a literature
review, followed by sections that describe our methodology and results, and discuss the
implications of our findings for tax policy makers and tax researchers.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Universally, people are concerned with motivation, i.e., how to move themselves or others to act
(Deci, 2016). While there are a number of possible theoretical frameworks that could be used to
examine the tax amnesty decision, we explore this decision from the perspective of intrinsic and
extrinsic motivations. A well-established psychology literature indicates that motivation can be
either extrinsic (external to an individual, such as a third-party reward) or intrinsic (within an
individual, such as self-esteem) (e.g., Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Franco & Svensgaard, 2012;
Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryan, 2012; Sheldon & Kasser, 2008). Extrinsic and intrinsic motivations
each affect economic decision-making (Gneezy, Meier, & Rey-Biel, 2011; Kakinaka & Kotani,
2011). Different regions of the brain are responsible for processing each type of motivation
(Murayama, Matsumoto, Izuma, & Matsumoto, 2010).
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The purpose of this literature review is to identify possible extrinsic and intrinsic motives that may
be associated with tax amnesty decision-making. To this end, we peruse the empirical literatures
on tax amnesties specifically, and tax compliance more broadly. We also searched the broader
ethical decision-making and customer service literatures, since a decision to self-correct is an
ethical decision, and involves a service interaction with a tax authority. Finally, we reviewed
descriptions of past and current tax amnesty programs to isolate motives that could be relevant for
tax amnesty decision-making.
Tax Amnesty Literature
Empirical studies have addressed two main ways in which amnesties can affect tax revenue
collected: direct gains from participation in the amnesty (Alm and Beck, 1991; Fisher et al., 1989;
Hasseldine, 1998; Luitel & Sobel, 2007), and indirect effects on tax compliance following an
amnesty (Alm et al., 1990; Alm & Beck, 1993; Andreoni, 1991; Christian et al., 2002; LópezLaborda & Rodrigo, 2003; Luna et al., 2006; Malik & Schwab, 1991; Rechberger et al., 2010;
Torgler & Schaltegger, 2005; Young, 1994). This literature focuses on the impact of post-amnesty
revenue collection, or taxpayers' compliance subsequent to an amnesty, rather than on taxpayers’
underlying motivations to actually participate in an amnesty program. Nevertheless, the findings
of each study are now briefly described, with a view to identifying possible motives that may be
influential in the tax amnesty participation decision.
Fisher et al. (1989) examine the effectiveness of a state tax amnesty in Michigan, and find that
overall revenues did not increase substantially due to the amnesty. Alm & Beck (1991) develop
an economic model of amnesty participation, test it using data from twenty-eight states in the
United States, and find that taxpayers disclose more in an amnesty program when probability of
detection and penalties are expected to be greater. Hasseldine (1998) reviews 43 state tax amnesty
programs in the United States, finds that tax amnesty revenues as a percentage of state tax revenues
range from 0.008 to 2 percent, and finds that revenue collection declines with repeated amnesty
programs. Luitel & Sobel (2007) find that states that offer repeated tax amnesties generate less
revenue from the subsequent amnesties than the initial tax amnesties, and find reduced compliance
following tax amnesties. Alm et al. (1990) also find that compliance decreases after an amnesty.
One economic model developed by Andreoni (1991) predicts that cheating increases when a
permanent tax amnesty is enacted. Similarly, Malik & Schwab (1991)’s economic model shows
that taxpayers report less income as the probability of an amnesty rises. Alm & Beck (1993)
conduct a time-series economic analysis on a Colorado state tax amnesty, and suggest that this
amnesty did not result in significant long-term post-amnesty revenue collection. Young (1994)
examined characteristics of amnesty participants, and found that single males, and individuals with
occupations in sales or who were self-employed, were more likely to participate in tax amnesties.
Christian et al. (2002) found that the increase in tax revenues following a Michigan state tax
amnesty was negligible. López-Laborda & Rodrigo (2003) evaluated the long-term impact of a
Spanish tax amnesty, and found that the amnesty had no effect on tax collection in the short- or
long-term. Torgler & Schaltegger (2005) experimentally examined the effect of taxpayers’ voting
approval for a tax amnesty on subsequent reporting compliance, and found that tax compliance
increased only after group discussion and voting. Luna et al. (2006) review a number of state tax
amnesties, identify features of each, and conclude that the long-term compliance effect is unclear.
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Rechberger et al. (2010) examine the perceived justice of a tax amnesty on subsequent reporting
compliance, and found that this relation is mediated by retribution and value restoration.
These studies tend to conclude that revenue collection effects of amnesties are modest at best, and
that reporting compliance following an amnesty tends to suffer. Amnesties generate relatively
little revenue in part because participation in amnesties is low. Our research focuses on
antecedents of participation, which has the potential to improve revenue collection. Only one study
(Alm & Beck, 1991) explicitly identifies possible motives that might influence taxpayer
participation in tax amnesties. Alm & Beck (1991) conclude that probability of detection and
penalties are important motives. For the majority of studies, the reason(s) taxpayers participate in
tax amnesties is (are) not stated, and is (are) implied to be economic in nature. Consequently,
much remains to be learned as to why taxpayers might be inclined to participate in a tax amnesty
program.
Other Tax Compliance Literature
Consistent with the tax amnesty literature, conventional economic models of tax compliance
suggest that the compliance decision is an economic decision, such that taxpayers weigh economic
gains from evasion with possible sanctions from having their evasion detected and identified by
the tax authority (e.g., Sandmo, 2005). In other words, the tax evasion decision is a function of
detection likelihood, the size of the penalty, and the individual’s degree of risk aversion (Slemrod,
2007). Thus, likelihood of detection, penalties, and risk tolerance are relevant for tax reporting
compliance decisions, and may also be relevant for self-correction decisions.
A number of tax studies have also considered how tax morale impacts tax compliance (see Torgler,
2007, for a review). Tax morale is, “the collective name for all the non-rational factors and
motivations – such as social norms, personal values, and various cognitive processes – that
strongly affect an individual’s voluntary compliance with laws” (Kornhauser, 2007, p. 602). Tax
morale is synonymous with intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (McKerchar et al., 2013). The tax
morale literature suggests that perceptions of fairness, trust in government, exchange equity,
culture, and moral rules and sentiments all impact tax morale (e.g., Alm & Torgler, 2006; Frey &
Torgler, 2007; McKerchar et al., 2013; Pope & McKerchar, 2011). Thus, these factors may also
influence taxpayers’ decisions to participate in a tax amnesty.
We also consulted tax compliance literature reviews to identify possible factors that may also be
relevant for tax amnesty decision-making (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998; Cuccia, 1994;
Fischer, Wartick, & Mark, 1992; Jackson & Milliron, 1986). Sanctions (penalties) and probability
of detection were the predominant factors that were identified, along with other factors of guilt
and social norms. All of these factors may affect taxpayers’ extrinsic or intrinsic motivations.
Other factors that affected tax compliance in these studies, such as demographic variables, are not
inherently intrinsic or extrinsic, and thus we did not include them as possible extrinsic or intrinsic
motives in the study, but rather measured and controlled for them when relevant.
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Ethical Decision-Making and Customer Service Literatures
To identify other motives that may influence the tax amnesty decision, we examine the broader
ethical decision-making and customer service literatures.5 We identified guilt, embarrassment and
moral pride as motives relevant to ethical decision-making (Tangney, Steuwig & Mashek, 2007),
as well as personal responsibility and peer reaction (Bobek, Hageman & Kelliher, 2013). Luria,
Gal & Yagil (2009) identify belief that an individual will be treated fairly and ease of making
restitution as additional factors that may influence individuals’ willingness to report customer
service complaints. Since taxpayers receive some degree of customer service when they interact
with a tax authority, factors that influence customer service interactions may also be relevant for
tax amnesty decisions.
Tax Amnesty Program Descriptions
We also read descriptions of tax amnesty programs worldwide (Baer & Le Borgne, 2008;
Malherbe, 2011; OECD, 2015b) to identify other motives that could be relevant. Items that
emerged related to: elapsed time; whether or not the taxpayer had the financial means to make
restitution; the size of the penalty; and the amount of interest owing.
METHODOLOGY
Our research questions concern the relative importance of extrinsic and intrinsic motives to
taxpayers when contemplating participation in a tax amnesty, and how their preferences for
extrinsic and intrinsic motives vary according to the magnitude of their tax error. We address these
questions using a quasi-experimental conjoint methodology. In the subsections that follow, we
describe conjoint analysis, how we determined the extrinsic and intrinsic motives to use in the
conjoint analysis, the experimental procedures, and the results.
Conjoint Analysis
In this section, we describe the conjoint analysis that we conducted to assess and understand the
roles of extrinsic and intrinsic motives in tax amnesty decision-making. Conjoint analysis is a
statistical technique, used most often in marketing research, to understand individuals’ preferences
for product features. A product has attributes (such as colour and size), and each attribute has
several features (such as red, blue, and green colours; and small and large sizes). Conjoint analysis
allows researchers to determine which combinations of product features are most preferred by
consumers. Conjoint analysis helps researchers understand how consumers make choices among
competing product features.
Conjoint statistical software computes a “part-worth utility” (a numerical value) for each feature
of each attribute. Part-worth utilities of a particular product feature can be compared within each
attribute to assess respondents’ relative preferences of a product feature; and part-worth utilities
from one attribute can be combined with part-worth utilities from another attribute, and compared
with other similar combinations. Thus, in the above example, part-worth utilities from one colour
Using the ABI/Inform database, we searched ethics, hospitality, and marketing journals for the terms ‘motivation’
and ‘motive’.
5
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could be compared with part-worth utilities of all other colours; and a part-worth utility from a
colour could be combined with a part-worth utility from a size, and compared to any other similar
combination. However, part-worth utilities from one attribute cannot be compared with part-worth
utilities from another attribute (Orme, 2010). Thus, in the above example, a part-worth utility of
a colour could not be compared with a part-worth utility of a size.
While conjoint analysis tends to be used in marketing research, tax researchers have also employed
this method, though not with respect to tax amnesty decisions (O’Neil, 1982; Blaufus, Bob,
Hundsdoerfer, Kiesewetter & Weimann, 2013; Blaufus & Ortlieb, 2009; Hundsdoerfer &
Sichtmann, 2009; Milliron & Toy, 1988; O’Neil, 1982). We examine the tax amnesty decision
using a motivational psychology framework, in which there are two underlying attributes (extrinsic
motivation and intrinsic motivation), with several features of each attribute (corresponding to
specific extrinsic and intrinsic motives).
There are several advantages to using the conjoint methodology for this study. Conjoint analysis
is a powerful way in which to analyze the relative importance of multiple features simultaneously.
This method requires respondents to consider multiple attributes of their decision simultaneously,
such that they must make trade-offs between different motives. Conjoint analysis also allows us
to examine a larger number of motives than a traditional experiment, which is important, given the
exploratory nature of the research. However, there is a restriction on the number of features each
attribute can have; specifically, the number of features per attribute should not exceed four (Orme,
2010). Therefore, we are limited to including four extrinsic motives and four intrinsic motives in
the conjoint analysis.
Selection of Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motives
To determine the four extrinsic and four intrinsic motives for use in the conjoint analysis, we
initially compiled lists of 10 extrinsic and 11 intrinsic motives, using the findings from our
literature review. Along with another academic, we independently categorized each motive we
identified from the literature review as extrinsic or intrinsic, and reached a consensus as to the final
classification.6
To validate our selection of motives, as well as our categorization of these motives as extrinsic and
intrinsic, and to identify the four most influential motives across both categories, we conducted a
pretest. Pretests are used commonly in behavioral research to substantiate an initial selection of
items for use in a questionnaire, as well as to check for glitches in wording (e.g., Hite, 1998; Libby
& Thorne, 2007).
The pretest was conducted on 65 adult students (average age of 28.8 years) in two tax classes.7
Participants read a brief background about tax amnesties, were given a list of motives, and were
6

We were unable to reach consensus as to the extrinsic or intrinsic nature of two factors (the amount of the mistake,
and the amount of time that has passed since the mistake). To determine whether a typical taxpayer thought these
would be intrinsic or extrinsic motivations, we surveyed participants in our pretest (see footnote 8). Regardless, this
issue is not relevant, as neither factor was retained for the conjoint analysis.
7
The sample does not need to be the same as the population, as long as there is nothing in the sample that is expected
to bias the results (Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, & Pronk, 2007). Nothing about the pretest sample was expected to bias
the results.
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asked to rank them in terms of their importance in the tax amnesty decision.8 They were then
asked if there were any additional reasons that were not listed that would be influential in this
decision, and if any wording or any factors were unclear, which helped us to further refine the
wording used, and helped to ensure that we had not overlooked other important motives. No
additional motives were identified.
The pretest results (not tabulated) indicated that the most important extrinsic motives were:
wanting to avoid a penalty; the size of the penalty; probability of the error being detected by the
tax authority; and effort to disclose.9 There was also agreement that the most important intrinsic
motives were: responsibility to pay the taxes owed; satisfaction for correcting the mistake; feeling
guilty for not paying the tax; and concern about how the taxpayer would be treated.
Below, we tabulate the initial lists of motives, classified as extrinsic or intrinsic, and indicate in
bold font the four extrinsic and four intrinsic motives retained for our subsequent conjoint study.

8

To cross-validate the pretest results, one class was given a list of all possible motives, while the other class was given
lists of extrinsic and intrinsic motives separately. Using two groups of students provides greater assurance regarding
the consistency of their rankings of the most important motives. We compared results from both classes, which were
largely consistent (see footnote 9), i.e., the most important extrinsic and intrinsic motives were ranked similarly across
both classes. At the end of the pretest, participants were also provided with a definition of intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation, and asked whether they thought two ambiguous items (the amount of the mistake and the amount of time
that has passed since the mistake, were primarily intrinsic or primarily extrinsic.
9
One class rated amount of the mistake just higher than effort to disclose, but we retained effort to disclose, since the
size of the penalty is a function of the amount of the mistake, and the two items could be confounded.
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Table 1 – Initial list of extrinsic and intrinsic motives when contemplating a tax amnesty
disclosure *
Extrinsic motives

Intrinsic motives

4)

Concern about other people’s opinion of 
me for not paying the tax.
The amount of time that has passed since
the mistake.
The length of time that the voluntary

disclosure program is available.
The size of the penalty.


5)

Wanting to avoid paying a penalty.

6)

The amount of interest.

7)

The amount of the mistake.

1)
2)
3)

Feeling guilty about not paying the tax.
Feeling guilty about making the mistake.
Feeling embarrassed for not paying the tax.
Feeling embarrassed for making the mistake.

 Feeling embarrassed if the mistake is
discovered by the tax authority.
Feeling satisfaction for paying the tax.

Feeling satisfaction for correcting the
mistake.
8) Concern that paying the amount owed
Feeling responsibility to pay the taxes
will affect my lifestyle.
owed.
9) The amount of effort required to
Feeling responsibility to pay taxes in
general.
disclose my mistake.
10) The chance that I'll get caught in the
Feeling uncertainty about being detected by
future if I don't admit my mistake now. the tax authority.
11)
Concern about how the tax authority will
treat me if I admit my mistake.
* Note: items in bold font represent items retained for use in the conjoint analysis.
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Procedures
We perform a choice-based conjoint analysis, using the shortlists of four extrinsic and four intrinsic
motives, to gauge the relative importance of each motive within their respective motivation
categories. Our design is a fractional-factorial design, in which selections of combinations of
motives are presented to the respondents. A full-factorial design, in which all combinations are
presented to participants, is impractical due to respondent fatigue, so fractional-factorial designs
are used instead, and are just as effective as full-factorial designs (Tovares, Boatwright, & Cagan,
2014).
Respondents were United States taxpayers recruited from a large market research firm, and chosen
randomly from across the United States, but segmented according to gender and age (individuals
at least 18 years of age). Respondents read a brief background about tax amnesty programs,
followed by a vignette in which they were asked to imagine that they had made an unintentional
mistake on their tax return (either $500, $5,000, or $50,000), and were then presented with a series
of screens that presented three choice combinations per screen. Each choice combination had one
extrinsic and one intrinsic motive.10 Respondents were asked which combination of the three
would be most effective at convincing them to report their mistake to the tax authority. Their
answer determined, in part, which combinations appeared on the next screen, as programmed by
the software. A sample screenshot is below in Figure 1.
Figure 1 – Sample screenshot

10

We acknowledge that tax amnesty decisions are not comprised of exactly one intrinsic and one extrinsic motive,
but in order to determine the relative importance of the intrinsic and extrinsic motives using conjoint analysis, this setup is required. To address the concern that the decision may not be based on one extrinsic and one intrinsic motive,
we conducted a supplemental analysis, in which participants freely indicated the importance of each motive without
regard to whether it was extrinsic or intrinsic.
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It is important to examine how taxpayers’ motivational preferences may vary across different error
thresholds. Ariely (2008) and Mazar, Amir, & Ariely (2008) suggest and find evidence that
individuals can justify dishonesty in small amounts without compromising a positive view of
themselves, but not in large amounts. Consequently, taxpayers with relatively small errors may
be motivated differently than taxpayers with relatively large errors.
We were unable to find any guidance in the academic literature on choices of dollar magnitudes
for use in an experiment. Although our choices of dollar magnitudes are subjective, we used the
vignette development suggestions of Weber (1992) and Hughes & Huby (2004), who emphasize
that vignettes must be as realistic as possible. We chose an upper limit of $50,000, after consulting
an industry publication which reports dollar amounts of frauds, as well as considering anecdotal
evidence reported in the business press, and used our pretest to verify that this amount was
plausible to respondents.11 Once we chose the upper limit, we chose the other two amounts ($5,000
and $500) as equidistant intervals on a logarithmic scale.
A total of 1,266 taxpayers completed the instrument. To ensure high data quality, the instrument
contained two ‘attention check’ questions.12 Respondents who failed one or both of these
questions were terminated, and their responses were not included in the final tally. The average
age of a respondent was 45.3 years, and 52.1% of the sample was female. Detailed demographic
information is contained in Table 2.
To gauge the effectiveness of the error magnitude manipulation, respondents were asked to rate
their agreement with the following statement: The amount of taxes owed was quite large.
Respondents rated this statement on a 7-point Likert scale, where 1=strongly disagree and
7=strongly agree. The mean scores for respondents in the $500, $5,000, and $50,000 conditions
were 3.87, 5.80, and 6.61, respectively, which are in the expected direction. Furthermore, MannWhitney U-tests showed significant differences in these scores between the $500 and $5,000
groups (Z=15.53, p<0.01), and between the $5,000 and $50,000 groups (Z=10.61, p<0.01).
Therefore, the error magnitudes were effectively manipulated across conditions.

We consulted the “Report to the Nation” of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE 2014), which
reported a median dollar amount for intentional mistakes of $145,000. Our upper threshold of $50,000 is well below
this median figure, as we felt that taxpayers would have difficulty relating to any higher amount as an unintentional
mistake. Furthermore, our upper threshold of $50,000 appears plausible, given stories in the American popular press
of two potential government appointees who made unintentional tax errors in the amounts of $34,000 and $140,000
(Reuters, 2009). None of the pretest participants expressed concern over an upper limit of $50,000.
12
One question was, “In the scenario, how much did it say you owe in taxes?” Respondents could choose between a)
$500, b) $5,000, or c) $50,000. The correct answer depended upon experimental condition. The other question was,
“In the scenario, what was the reason provided for why you owe taxes?” The options were: a) you intentionally made
a mistake in the past; b) you unintentionally made a mistake in the past; and c) the IRS made a mistake, and as a result,
you owe more in taxes.
11

57

Journal of Tax Administration Vol 2:2 2016

Tax Amnesty Decisions

Table 2 – Demographic profile statistics

Sample size
Gender
male
female
Age
Education
less than high school
high school
some college courses
college graduate
post-graduate degree
Income
less than $25,000
$25,000 to $49,999
$50,000 - $74,999
$75,000 - $99,999
Over $100,000
Prefer not to respond
Ever made a tax
amnesty disclosure?
yes
no

$500 error
423

$5,000 error
422

$50,000 error
421

All responses
1,266

197 (46.6%)
226 (53.4%)
43.9

211 (50.0%)
211 (50.0%)
44.8

199 (47.3%)
222 (52.7%)
47.4

607 (47.9%)
659 (52.1%)
45.3

3 (0.7%)
75 (17.7%)
129 (30.5%)
151 (35.7%)
65 (15.4%)

3 (0.7%)
71 (16.8%)
140 (33.2%)
140 (33.2%)
68 (16.1%)

7 (1.7%)
71 (16.9%)
154 (36.6%)
122 (29.0%)
67 (15.9%)

13 (1.0%)
217 (17.1%)
423 (33.4%)
413 (32.6%)
200 (15.8%)

75 (17.7%
126 (29.8%)
85 (20.1%)
72 (17.0%)
57 (13.5%)
8 (1.9%)

80 (19.0%)
107 (25.4%)
89 (21.1%)
59 (14.0%)
80 (19.0%)
7 (1.7%)

95 (22.6%)
107 (25.4%)
82 (19.5%)
53 (12.6%)
79 (18.8%)
5 (1.2%)

250 (19.7%)
340 (26.9%)
256 (20.2%)
184 (14.5%)
216 (17.1%)
20 (1.6%)

16 (3.8%)
407 (96.2%)

26 (6.2%)
396 (93.8%)

11 (2.6%)
410 (97.4%)

53 (4.2%)
1,213 (95.8%)

RESULTS
We first examined which extrinsic and intrinsic motives have the greatest influence on taxpayers’
decisions to correct a tax error (Research Question 1). To address this question, we examined the
part-worth utilities of each motive. We then take the antilog of the part-worth utilities in order to
express them as a proportion, so that we can predict the percentage of the population that is
influenced by each attribute (Sawtooth Software, 2002). The average from all respondents of the
part-worth utilities, the antilogs, and the relative percentages are presented in Table 3.
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Table 3 – Part-worth utility scores for extrinsic and intrinsic motives

Factor
Partworth
utility

$500 error
antilog
Percentage

Partworth
utility

$5,000 error
antilog
Percentage

Partworth
utility

$50,000 error
antilog
Percentage

MANOVA
between groups

EXTRINSIC
Avoiding a
penalty

0.92

2.50

51.76%

0.94

2.57

52.76%

0.98

2.68

53.67%

F=1.04, p=0.35

Future detection

0.04

1.04

21.53%

0.02

1.02

21.02%

0.03

1.03

20.65%

F=0.04, p=0.96

Penalty size

-0.18

0.83

17.18%

-0.21

0.81

16.58%

-0.15

0.86

17.20%

F=1.26, p=0.28

Effort

-0.78

0.46

9.53%

-0.76

0.47

9.64%

-0.86

0.42

8.48%

F=1.75, p=0.17

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

INTRINSIC
Factor

Responsibility

Partworth
utility
0.54

Satisfaction

$500 error
antilog
Percentage

1.72

39.36%

Partworth
utility
0.56

0.26

1.30

29.75%

Guilt

-0.27

0.76

Treatment

-0.53

0.59

$5,000 error
antilog
Percentage

$50,000 error
antilog
Percentage

MANOVA
between groups

1.84

41.25%

F=0.90, p=0.41

1.76

39.45%

Partworth
utility
0.61

0.32

1.38

31.05%

0.27

1.32

29.42%

F=0.60, p=0.55

17.47%

-0.23

0.80

17.92%

-0.23

0.79

17.68%

F=0.61, p=0.54

13.42%

-0.66

0.52

11.58%

-0.65

0.52

11.66%

F=1.02, p=0.36

100.0%

100.0%
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Results indicate that the most important extrinsic factor is the desire to avoid paying a penalty,
followed by the probability of future detection, the size of the penalty, and the amount of effort
required to disclose the mistake. Overall, the desire to avoid paying a penalty was rated to be
approximately 2.5 times more important than the next most important factor, the probability of
future detection, and was rated just over three times more important than the size of the penalty.
Results also indicate that the most important intrinsic factor is a feeling of responsibility to pay
the taxes owed, followed by satisfaction for correcting the mistake, feeling guilty for not paying
the tax, and concern for how the authorities would treat the taxpayer. The responsibility factor
was rated only slightly higher than the satisfaction factor (about 0.15 times), but responsibility
was rated more than twice as important as guilt and almost three times as important as treatment
by the tax authority.
We then examined how tax error magnitudes impacted respondents’ choices of extrinsic and
intrinsic motives (Research Question 2). To address this question, we conducted a MANOVA
of the part-worth utilities for all 8 motives across each error condition. As the columns in Table
3 show, there were no significant differences in part-worth utilities for any extrinsic or intrinsic
factors. Therefore, the relative importance of any extrinsic or intrinsic motives did not vary
significantly by error condition.
Supplemental Analysis
Because conjoint analysis does not allow us to examine the relative importance of intrinsic
versus extrinsic motives, we conducted a supplemental analysis to address this issue. Using a
different set of participants (also recruited from an online survey company), we presented 299
participants with the same background information and scenario as in the conjoint analysis
study.13 Rather than asking them to select among pairs of intrinsic and extrinsic motives, we
asked them to allocate 100 points to each of the eight possible motives, based on how influential
the motives would be if making a tax amnesty decision. As in the conjoint study, we split the
participants into three groups, according to three error magnitudes ($500, $5,000, and $50,000).
Overall, we found that participants allocated 66% of their points to extrinsic factors and 34%
of their points to intrinsic factors. These findings suggest that extrinsic factors are significantly
more important than intrinsic factors.14
Similar to the conjoint study, using MANOVA, we did not find any significant differences in
extrinsic/intrinsic allocations across error conditions at the 0.05 level of significance.15
Therefore, this finding provides additional independent evidence that taxpayers’ motivations
appear stable across error magnitudes. Table 4 reports the mean extrinsic and intrinsic scores
for this supplemental analysis, across the three error conditions.

__________________
13

The average age of a respondent was 36.9 and 54% were male.
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests across all three conditions were significant: in the $500 condition, Z=-5.841, p<0.01;
in the $5,000 condition, Z=-6.407, p<0.01; and in the $50,000 condition, Z=-5.383, p<0.01.
15
The amount of points allocated to any motive did not vary significantly across any error condition at the 0.05
level of significance. Furthermore, Mann-Whitney U test results are as follows: for the scores in the $500 vs.
$5,000 condition, Z=-0.623, p=0.53; for the scores in the $5,000 vs. $50,000 condition, Z=-0.819, p=0.41; and
for the scores in the $500 vs. $50,000 condition, p=0.87.
14
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Table 4 – Allocation between extrinsic and intrinsic motives

Intrinsic only
Extrinsic only

All data
(n=299)
34.16
65.84
100

$500 error
(n=102)
34.46
65.54
100

$5,000 error
(n=100)
32.34
67.66
100

$50,000 error
(n=97)
35.71
64.29
100

DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS
In this research, we provide preliminary evidence that both extrinsic and intrinsic motives
influence taxpayer decision-making in a tax amnesty context. Specifically, we identify and
analyze the key extrinsic and intrinsic motives that influence taxpayers’ amnesty decisions.
We first developed shortlists of the four most important extrinsic and intrinsic motives,
respectively. We then used both sets of motives in a quasi-experimental conjoint analysis,
where we were able to determine respondents’ relative preferences for each motive within both
categories of motivation, across three error magnitudes ($500, $5,000, and $50,000). We found
that desire to avoid a penalty was the most important extrinsic motive, and responsibility for
paying the taxes owed was the most important intrinsic motive. Our results further indicate
that the magnitude of the tax error does not influence the relative importance of extrinsic or
intrinsic motivational factors in tax amnesty decision-making. Thus, taxpayers’ motivational
preferences appear stable across tax error magnitudes. In a supplemental analysis, we
determined that extrinsic factors are responsible for approximately two-thirds of the decision
to participate in a tax amnesty, whereas intrinsic factors are responsible for approximately onethird.
We extend and contribute to the literature on tax amnesties by identifying influential extrinsic
and intrinsic motives, and by showing that intrinsic motivations have an influential albeit less
significant role than extrinsic motivations on taxpayer’s decisions to participate in a tax
amnesty. We also extend the broader tax compliance literature by finding that in a tax amnesty
context, the size of taxpayers’ errors does not seem to influence their underlying motivations
to cooperate with a tax authority.
As with all behavioral research, this study has limitations. To prevent decision fatigue, and
because of the constraints of conjoint analysis, the list of potential motives was not exhaustive.
Therefore, it is possible that our results would have differed had we used additional motives.
Also, since this study was tested on taxpayers from the United States, results should be applied
cautiously to other jurisdictions. Future research could consider how taxpayers in other
countries are motivated to make amnesty disclosures, since there may be cultural differences
that impact taxpayers’ extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. We also acknowledge that
participants in our study were asked about their motivations in a hypothetical scenario rather
than in an actual situation. Thus, our study captures participants’ intended, rather than actual,
motivations.
Although most of the respondents do not have direct experience with tax amnesties, it would
be infeasible to recruit respondents who had participated, or would consider participating, in a
tax amnesty. However, participants in this study were able to relate to and understand the
scenario, evidenced by correctly answering the attention check questions, and from reading the
comments in the pretest. Additionally, hypothetical vignettes are a useful tool when studying
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an ethical topic with which individuals may not be personally familiar (Dunn et al., 2016;
Weber, 1992; Hughes & Huby, 2004; Mudrack & Mason, 2013; Weber, 1992).
Tax compliance researchers have suggested that a responsive regulation approach between
taxpayers and tax authorities (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001), which seeks to foster
cooperative attitudes from taxpayers using intrinsic motivations in addition to extrinsic
motivations, may be more effective than a traditional deterrence approach, which relies on
extrinsic motivations. Furthermore, Kirchler (2007), Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl (2008), and
Alm et al. (2012) suggest a “slippery slope framework” of tax compliance, in which voluntary
compliance and enforced compliance are both present. According to this framework, voluntary
compliance depends on the right mix of trust in tax authorities, which is largely a function of
intrinsic motivations, such as perceived fairness, and enforcement, such as threat of penalties.
The results from our conjoint analysis provide support for this paradigm and additional insight
regarding specific factors that are relevant in a tax amnesty decision.
Both our conjoint study and supplemental analysis, using different samples, revealed that
taxpayers’ intrinsic and extrinsic motivations did not significantly differ across error
magnitudes. This finding may suggest that it is a taxpayer's anxiety about having made an error
that triggers specific motivational responses, rather than the amount of the error. This
suggestion is consistent with Bobek, Hatfield & Wentzel (2007), who found that taxpayers
perceive satisfaction and enjoyment from receiving refunds, to the extent that they will overpay
interim tax payments to ensure they are in a refund position when they submit their annual tax
return. In Bobek et al. (2007), it was the fact that taxpayers were in a refund position, rather
than the size of the refund, that provided satisfaction. Similarly, the reasons for correcting an
error may not be related to the magnitude of an error, but rather to the fact that a taxpayer has
anxiety over making an error.
Another implication of our findings, specific to tax amnesties, is that authorities may be most
likely to encourage taxpayers’ participation in an amnesty if taxpayers know that they can avoid
penalties, since this was the most important extrinsic motive in the conjoint study. Thus, tax
authorities could promote tax amnesties with a message that focuses on penalty avoidance.
Since tax authorities worldwide are increasingly adopting permanent amnesty programs
(OECD, 2015b), promoting awareness of these initiatives will become increasingly important,
as will tailoring a message to encourage taxpayers to self-correct.
Another implication of our findings is that intrinsic motivations appear to have some role in
taxpayers’ amnesty decision-making. Although the role of intrinsic motivations does not
appear to be as influential as extrinsic motivations, it may be possible for tax authorities to
appeal to intrinsic motives, which may simultaneously enhance taxpayers’ extrinsic
motivations and, in turn, increase the likelihood of cooperation with authorities. Specifically,
Frey & Jegen (2001) suggest that, in some circumstances, intrinsic motivations can enhance
the strength of extrinsic motivations in influencing behaviour (Frey & Jegen, 2001). While
further research is needed to examine the joint influence of extrinsic and intrinsic motives on
the decision to participate in a tax amnesty, given the relative lack of success of tax amnesty
programs which rely solely on economic (extrinsic) motives, tax authorities may want to
consider how influential intrinsic motives, such as responsibility to pay one’s taxes, can be
paired with influential extrinsic motives, such as desire to avoid penalties, to enhance the
effectiveness of a tax amnesty program. We encourage further research to investigate this
possibility.
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